The instinct that kills GTM motions
The most common GTM mistake I see in early-stage companies is trying to address too many buyers, with too many messages, across too many use cases — all at once. It feels like the right move. More addressable market, more shots at revenue, more options if one thing doesn't work.
It's actually the fastest way to build a motion that doesn't work for anyone.
The Wedge Entry Model is built on a different premise: that narrow, deep, and decisive beats broad, shallow, and diversified in early-stage GTM — every time.
Why narrower wins
When you try to sell to everyone, you end up being no one's obvious choice. Buyers don't buy "good enough for a lot of people." They buy "exactly right for someone like me." The more precisely you can describe the person you're for and the specific problem you solve for them, the more that exact person will choose you over a broader alternative.
This isn't a positioning theory. It's a buying psychology reality.
Named from 14 years of watching underfunded founders beat well-capitalised competitors by going narrower, not wider — the pattern is consistent enough to be a rule.
The three moves
Move 1: Identify the wedge
The wedge is the intersection of three things: the problem you solve better than anyone else, the customer who feels that problem most acutely, and the context that makes your solution the obvious choice right now.
Most companies can identify one or two of these clearly. The work is finding all three.
The test for a good wedge: if you described your ideal customer and their situation to a room of 100 people, fewer than five should raise their hand. If more than that qualify, the wedge is still too broad.
Move 2: Own it completely
Once you've found the wedge, the imperative is domination — not just presence. You want to be the undisputed answer for that specific problem, for that specific customer. That means your messaging speaks only to them. Your sales motion is built around their decision process. Your success metrics are their success metrics.
This phase is uncomfortable for founders who feel they're "leaving money on the table." They're not. They're building a proof point that money can't buy: the ability to say, with evidence, "we are the only obvious choice for X."
Move 3: Expand from proof
Expansion from a dominated wedge is qualitatively different from expansion from a diffuse early motion. When you own a wedge, you have:
- Customer references who speak a specific, credible language
- A sales motion that has been tested to a high degree of precision
- A product that has been shaped by deep engagement with a single problem
- A reputation that travels, because your customers know exactly what to say about you
Expansion into adjacent segments, geographies, or use cases from this position is a different exercise from starting fresh. You're not guessing. You're extending from evidence.
Common failure modes
Widening before owning. The wedge is starting to work, pipeline is building, and leadership decides it's time to expand the ICP. Almost always premature. The wedge hasn't been fully owned — there's still significant untapped value in the original target. Expanding now means splitting focus before the proof point is strong enough to carry into adjacent markets.
Choosing the wedge by market size rather than by fit. The right wedge is the one where you win most convincingly — not the one that represents the largest addressable market. A 100% win rate in a $50M segment is a stronger foundation than a 20% win rate in a $500M segment.
Mistaking the user for the buyer. The wedge is defined by who buys, not who uses. These are often different people, with different problems, different metrics, and different decision criteria. The wedge has to be built around the economic buyer — the person who controls the budget and makes the final call.
Using this framework
I use the Wedge Entry Model as both a diagnostic and a design tool.
As a diagnostic: I map where a company is currently trying to compete — across how many segments, with how many messages, through how many channels — and then trace their win rate and conversion metrics to find where they're actually winning. The wedge is almost always already visible in the data. The problem is that the company isn't treating it as the strategy.
As a design tool: For companies building a new motion or entering a new market, I use the model to force specificity before anything else is defined. The wedge question — for whom, for what problem, in what context — has to be answered before messaging, sales process, or channel strategy can be meaningful.